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News and Commentary 
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Maine's public interest groups: The Industrial Energy 
Consumers' Group  
[Editor's note: The actors in public policy include not only elected and appointed public 
officials, but also the public interest groups that promote various agendas. To help understand 
the perspectives of some of these groups, MPR plans to profile one of Maine's public interest 
groups in each issue.]  
The Industrial Energy Consumers' Group (IECG) has been one of the most active participants in 
electric regulation policy in Maine. The IECG has eight members, all of whom use relatively 
large amounts of electricity in their operations. These members include paper companies, such as 
Boise Cascade and Champion and manufacturers like Forster. Although IECG is best known for 
its participation in electric utility policy, its interests also spread to other energy issues. IECG has 
in the past hosted public conferences on Maine's energy policy.  
The membership of IECG does not include all major industrial users in Maine. Non-member 
industrial firms in Maine, such as Bath Iron Works and Madison Paper, also participate directly 
on a regular basis in electrical proceedings in Maine. Nor does the membership of IECG have a 
single homogeneous set of self-interests. Some members of IECG are co-generators that sell as 
well as buy electric power. These co-generators generally benefited from Maine's favorable co-
generation policies in the 1980s. Other members of IECG have benefited from various types of 
demand-side management incentives. Firms that neither co-generate nor benefit significantly 
from demand-side management would pay higher rates to finance those activities. These 
sometimes divergent interests propel an agenda that seems ad hoc at times.  
While the IECG consistently espouses policies for lower industrial rates, its positions on some 
rate design issues have not been entirely predictable. For example, the IECG advocated 
expansion of the electric lifeline program for low-income customers, even though industrial 
customers would bear part of that cost. Its position seemed to be that it is preferable to factor 
equity considerations into electric rates via a targeted program rather than through general rate 
structures. Unlike some regulatory intervenors, its positions frequently seem to calculate not only 
its short-run regulatory interests, but also its longer run political interests.  
IECG is represented by Preti, Flaherty, Pachios and Beliveau. Anthony Buxton, who formerly 
served as Democratic state chair, serves as executive director. Joseph Donahue, a lawyer who 
once served as general counsel at the Public Utilities Commission, and Mark LeDuc also 
represent IECG. The president of IECG is Glenn Poole of Champion International. The visibility 
of IECG's representation contributes to its prominence in electric utility policy.  
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